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There are generally three arguments used to justify inter-agency merger. First, 
functional expedience argument, which seeks effective ways to provide public 
services in order to enhance interaction with the public. Second, the cost reduction 
argument, which aims to eliminate administrative and procedural redundancies. 
Third, the consolidation argument, which is usually deployed as a response to 
geographical or demographic shifts. In reality, however, each of these arguments 
can be trumped by the prevailing organizational realities that influence the three 
stages of merger: pre-merger, merging, and post-merger.  
While the topic of inter-agency consolidation can be examined from public 
finance point of view, i.e. cost reduction argument, this paper focuses on service 
quality (functional expedience) from employees’ perspective, an aspect that has 
been found to be lacking in previous studies (Maher, 2015). This particularly true 
about public inter-agency consolidation. The topic of quality service has been 
studied extensively from the customers’ perspectives (Abernathy, 2012; Bushnell 
& Halus 1992; Wisniewski, 1996). With the hope to contribute to bridging this gap 
in the literature, this study explores inter-agency consolidation from employee’s 
perspectives. As such, the purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to explain the forces 
that continue to shape employees’ perceptions in the post-merger stage at the 
NYC’s Administration of Children Services (ACS) and (2) to examine the influence 
of employees’ perceptions their understanding of the agency’s mission and 
mandates.  
The story began in 2010 when NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed 
legislation officially merging the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) into the 
Administration for Children's Services (ASC). The result of the merger was that 
ACS created the Division of Youth and Family Justice (DYFJ) to provide juvenile 
justice services, which used to be the domain of DJJ. However, after six years and 
a new mayoral administration employees still identify with their old divisions while 
dealing with contradictory policies and procedures at times. Looking at the 
mandates of both agencies, there were apparent overlaps. The two agencies had 
liaised with each other to ensure the welfare of children and juveniles. Overlaps of 
processes and activities made it reasonable to consider consolidating ACS and DJJ 
under one management. We speculate that employees continuing to identify with 
their old agencies after six years is an indicator that organizational change 
components (OCC) – culture, policies and procedures, and communication– were 
not addressed sufficiently during the merger process. At worst, this could mean 
incomplete mission alignment and consequently ineffective coordination of 
activities and services even though the primary reason for merging the two agencies 
together was to effectively align processes and eliminate overlaps. 
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Historically, agencies are created to fulfill certain mandates, respond to 
specific needs and provide identified public goods and services. With the 
evolvement of public organizations and the constant changes in the provision of 
public goods and services, it is inevitable that there will be an overlap of activities 
among agencies. Municipalities are known to be keen on improving coordination 
among agencies as a way to improve service delivery. However, previous studies 
on municipal consolidation have long raised doubts about such optimism. On the 
contrary, approaching municipal consolidation without careful planning can create 
undesired organizational realities such as distorted views about the organization’s 
mission. Freeman & Rossi (2012) presented an alternative approach to inter-agency 
coordination and warned from issues affecting the new shared regulatory space 
which will shape the new organizational realities. It is also reasonable to think of 
inter-agency consolidation as a type of organizational change. Research has  shown 
that no matter how organizational change is designed, the results are likely to be 
meager compared to the enthusiasm with which leaders speak of the improvements 
to be reaped as a result of change (Denhardt, Denhardt & Aristigueta 2015).   
Organizationally, this papers is divided into five sections. The following 
section provides review of literature on mergers in the public sector, focusing on 
organizational factors that determine consolidation outcomes. These factors include 
pre-merger status, power, culture and future continuity. The third section presents 
the methodology used to conduct this study, covering design, tools for data 
gathering and data processing. The fourth section provides findings and discussion, 
where we attempt to assign meaning to the tabulated data gathered through 
questionnaire and follow up interviews. In the fifth section, we close by giving 
concluding remarks and policy implications.             
 
Merger in the Public Sector: Rationale and Challenges  
Consolidation in public organizations is neither new nor uncontroversial 
(Fleischmann, 2000). A brief glance at the history of merging municipal agencies 
suggests that one of the driving forces for consolidating services is to reduce costs 
and enhance delivery of services. It might be noteworthy to point out earlier that 
most of the studies on consolidation focused on local government and 
municipalities not exactly a merger at inter-agency level within a city or 
municipality. Yet, despite the lack of evidence, there is a wide spread belief that 
efficiency in government can be improved by reducing the number of departments 
and agencies and combining them into a large one. Karcher (1998) argued that new 
government and locales are usually created for the benefit of small group of people 
not necessarily larger public interests, concluding that voluntary and mandatory 
consolidation can be a remedy for fragmentation. Making a similar point, Mabuchi 
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(2001) contended that consolidation is likely to increase the efficiency of 
municipalities and local government. This potential increase in efficiency is usually 
accompanied with confusion about narratives, artifacts, networks and power, 
leading to misconception about spaces and identities.        
To a degree, the topic has been studied broadly and it remains a major area 
of interest for state and local governments as they strive to enhance services and 
curb costs. Political forces dealing with fragmented administrative work of 
government in multiple agencies have also been a driver for better coordination and 
alignment, which sometimes can be politically envisioned through inter-agency 
consolidation by political actors because “lawmakers frequently assign overlapping 
and fragmented delegations that require agencies to share regulatory space” 
(Freeman & Rossi, 2012, p. 1133). The political forces are understandable and so 
is their rationale but the deployed political solution in terms of consolidation is 
unlikely to solve the problems of modern fragmented governance, Freeman and 
Rossi concluded, recommending instead “stronger interagency coordination and 
improve coordination instrument” (p. 1133).  Notwithstanding this, elected officials 
continue to push for inter-agency consolidation and more often than not they use 
the functional expedience argument as a rationale. In the following sections, we 
examine internal and external forces in pre-merger stage and how they contribute 
to organizational identification during merging and in post-merger stage, including 
arguments about efficiency as a conduit for politics.     
 
Mergers and Identification: Benign forces with malignant outcomes  
Aside from the planed and designed efforts during the merger stages, there 
are factors that contribute to the way employees may continue to identify 
themselves in the post-merger stage. Previous studies have documented that the 
perceived external prestige (PEP) and communication influence employees' overall 
organizational identification in post-merger stage (Kamasak, 2011). Bartels, Pruyn, 
and de Jong (2009) conducted a longitudinal study on employee identification and 
concluded that “pre-merger identification primarily influences post-merger 
identification at the same organizational level … Internal communication climate 
is particularly important for employees' identification with their division. PEP 
affects employees' identification with the overall organization” (p. 113). The 
rationale for focusing on PEP is based on self-enhancement as a motive for 
organizational identification. Since ACS is the larger agency with a better prestige, 
one could have assumed that motivated by self-enhancement, DJJ’s employees 
would quickly identify with the new agency. Unsurprisingly, that is not the case 
because there were other factors at play as well. Elstak, Bhatt, Van Riel, Pratt, and 
Berens (2015) explored the interaction between self-enhancement and the 
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uncertainty reduction motives in shaping identification during a merger. Their 
study found that the self-enhancement motive and perceived external prestige 
(PEP) continued to “influence identification during the merger. However, its effects 
are diminished when considering the effect of the uncertainty reduction motive” ( 
p. 32). Elstak et al. joined the calls for thinking of organizational identification 
motives beyond self-enhancement, contending that multiple identification motives 
work during a major organizational change.  
Consequently, the pre-merger sense of identity appears to remain intact 
despite attempts of mission realignment and coordination. It is interesting to ponder 
whether such persistence is part of human psychology, i.e. holding on to the past, 
or rather a result of insufficient efforts to create a new sense of identity in the post-
merger stage. While this demand another line of inquiry, one can speculate that the 
answer is a mixture of both, for research has shown that there are specific 
determinants of employee’s identification during the merger stage. Using 
experimental case study comparing employees who were directly involved to those 
who were indirectly involved in a merger of police organizations, Bartels, Douwes, 
de Jong, and Pruyn  (2006) tested five factors: (1) identification with the pre-merger 
organization, (2) sense of continuity, (3) expected utility of the merger, (4) 
communication climate before the merger and (5) communication about the 
merger. These determinants appeared to explain the difference in organizational 
identification, which is measured based on expected identification before the 
merger. Bartels et al. concluded that:  
In order to obtain a strong identification with the soon-to-be-merged 
organization, managers should pay extra attention to current 
departments with weaker social bonds as these are expected to 
identify the least with the new organization. The role of the 
communication variables differed between the two employee 
groups: communication about the merger only contributed to the 
organizational identification of directly involved employees; and 
communication climate only affected the identification of indirectly 
involved employees (p. 49) 
Another way to examine organizational identification during a merger is to 
use the social identity model as conceptualized in the work of Turner and Tajfel 
(1986) and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987). The social identity 
model posits that people are similar in dress and behavior despite their presumed 
differences because  “groups and situations seem somehow to submerge uniqueness 
in a sea of commonality, and the same person behaves differently as he or she 
moves from situation to situation and group to group” (Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 7). 
Applying the social identity model to organizational merger, Giessner, Ullrich, and 
van Dick (2011) concluded that “levels of identification with the merged 
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organization are partly explained by status and dominance differences of the 
involved organizations, by motivational threats and uncertainties during the 
merger, and by the representation of the post-merger identity” (p.333).  
Motivational threat can often be a matter of perception regardless of what 
is actually happening. This is exactly where the communication climate comes into 
play as discussed earlier. Rumors about the negative impacts of change such as 
layoffs and reorganization are usually rampant during mergers. What is unusual in 
the case of ACS and DJJ is that years have passed and uncertainties have been 
cleared but the pre-merger identification remains relatively strong. In post-merger 
stage, one can assume that networks–formal and informal– in pre-merger stage 
were not disrupted enough to open venues for a new coalition and a sense of 
identity. Status and dominance differences in the pre-merger stage appear to 
continue to affect values and assumptions as well as power dynamics. Particularly, 
power dynamics are likely to be at play during merging and post-merger stages.  
In a study that  directly examined the group power dynamics in pre and post-
merger, Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, and Millet (2007) categorized pre-
merger identification, pre-merger group status and relative representation into 
low/high scale and compared that to a new merger group. Their study revealed that 
“high pre-merger identifiers identified more strongly with the merger group than 
did low pre-merger identifiers, but only when the relative representation was high. 
Pre-merger status did not influence post-merger identification” (p. 380). 
Emphasizing the role of social identification process, Fischer, Greitemeyer, Omay, 
and Frey (2007) contended that mergers have a limited success because they focus 
on financial and legal arrangements while ignoring human factors. They used social 
identity theory as a framework to explain the failure of most mergers, assigning 
three different status groups (high, low and equal status groups) to thirty-six small 
groups. The experiment revealed that the members of low-status groups provided 
the most negative responses to the merger in terms of identification with the merger 
group, satisfaction with the merger, common in-group identity, group cohesion and 
controllability. Boen et al. (2007) concluded that “contrary to expectations, status 
was not related to the performance of the groups.” (p. 203). If one is to extrapolate 
from this result to the case at hand, low-status group (DJJ employees) should be the 
ones to respond more negatively to the merger. Equally true, employee with 
stronger identification with either DJJ or ACS should be expected to embrace the 
merger and become the merger group while status and rank were irrelevant in the 
post-merger organizational identification.  
In a similar line of inquiry with slightly different implications, Lipponen, 
Wisse, and Jetten, (2017) argued that pre-merger status of merging partners relative 
to each other will impact post-merger identification because “relative pre-merger 
status determines employees' susceptibility to different aspects of the merger 
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process” (p. 692). They specifically argued that post-merger identification of 
employees from a high-status pre-merger organization will be influenced by pre-
merger identification and the perceived change in the status. Employees of a low 
status pre-merger organization will be strongly affected by the perceived sense of 
justice about the merger process. The authors concluded that “the extent to which 
pre-merger identification, status change, and justice are important determinants of 
post-merger identification depends on the relative pre-merger status of the merger 
partners” (p. 692). It appears that the pre-merger identification, among other 
factors, can predict post-merger identification only at the same organizational level 
as pointed out by Bartels, Pruyn, and de Jong (2009). Pre-merger status of merging 
organizations can have a significant impact on employees’ identification to the 
extent that an individual’s pre-merger identification becomes almost irrelevant 
without taking in account the pre-merger status of merging organizations. This 
observation elevates the discussion about power beyond the individual and group 
status to organization’s status at the time of a merger. The pre-merger status can 
also influence the narrative about the merger itself and in turn narrative will 
influence perceptions about justice and identification. 
Narratives about the merger, accurate or not, play a powerful role in the 
reconceptualization of space and identity. On one hand, separating a merger’s 
narratives from power dynamics, networks, and pre-merger status can be extremely 
complex. On the other hand, how narratives are constructed and disseminated can 
be traced and documented. In certain situations, narrative can be the single most 
influential factor in employees’ post-merger identification, for a narrative can be 
the reason for the perceived sense of justice or injustice. Study conducted by Gleibs, 
Noack, and Mummendey (2010) on in-group favoritism can shed light on how 
narratives can be crucial to identification. Gleibs et al. focused on the evolving 
dynamics of social identity processes during a merger at a university, showing that 
“pre-merger identification increased favoritism, but favoritism also increased pre-
merger identification … These results confirm that issues of identity change and 
compatibility are crucial aspects in understanding merger adjustment and support 
(p. 819).  
Within the social construction of meaning spectrum, narratives not only can 
evolve to take on a life of their own, but also can complicate things further for the 
new merger group. One can easily envision a scenario where employees from a 
high-status pre-merger organization utilizing their existing powerful networks, 
advancing their assumptions and values, maintaining their artifacts, and offering 
favors to members within their networks. On the other side of the aisle, one can 
also imagine employees from the low-status pre-merger organization congregating 
at the cafeteria, huddling in the hallways, sharing exaggerated details about who is 
appointed to lead the transition team, and constructing a deep sense of 
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victimization. By noon there is a wide spread sense of perceived injustice and 
organizational inequity, which requires a social response. One of the aggrieved 
proclaims ‘we gave them the benefit of the doubt and we came with open hearts 
only to be ignored and marginalized’. Whether in-group favoritism is real or 
imagined or a natural result of how people in power pick who they trust, now it is 
a reality for some and necessitates a social action. The narrative is likely to be 
dramatized even more and the aggrieved will hold onto their pre-merger 
identification as a cause. The powerful group might interpret the attitude of the 
aggrieved, which is meant to be a protest, as a lack of cooperation or a sign of not 
being on board with the new direction. The old networks and alliances will carry 
on without disruption, creating even further misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations, hence a vicious cycle of mutual alienation is created and 
maintained.    
There is also a possibility for creating and nurturing a different narrative, 
one that emphasizes bright future and downplays motivational threat and 
uncertainties. Many studies have shown that organizational identification is a key 
factor in predicting employees' behaviors during mergers. Employees from the 
subordinate partners are likely to maintain their old organizational identification in 
the post-merger stage. Examining projected continuity as a mediator between 
differential relationship in pre-merger and post-merger identification, Lupina-
Wegener, Drzensky, Ullrich, and van Dick (2014), argued that projected continuity 
mediates the differential relationships, which means knowledge about one’s future 
in the organization dictates one’s attitude toward the merger process. Additionally, 
pre-merger identification positively relates to projected continuity in the dominant 
group but negatively in the subordinate group. Thus, a merger is likely to be more 
successful if pre-and-post merger identification is reduced or eliminated in the 
subordinate group because “a key challenge in merger integration is to support high 
identifiers in the subordinate group in developing a projected continuity or a focus 
on ‘the bright tomorrow’” (Lupina-Wegener et al., 2014, p. 752). 
Another component of narrative and power dynamics lies in the cognitive 
representations of mergers. Previous studies have indicated that cognitive 
representations of mergers affect intergroup evaluations in particular and 
performance evaluation in general. Giessner and Mummendey (2008) examined the 
cognitive representations of mergers by looking at how three groups with varying 
identification (one group, dual identity, and two groups) interact with performance 
feedback (success and failure) to affect intergroup evaluations. They concluded that 
subgroup salience only indicates pre-merger in-group bias if superordinate group 
salience is low. However, there is low levels of in-group bias after merger success. 
The major point is that the higher the identification in the subordinate group the 
more in-group bias in the pre-merger and the less in the post-merger. In a nutshell, 
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a sense of unity in organizational identification yields less biased performance 
evaluation.     
As discussed elsewhere, mergers in private and public organizations are 
often predicated on functional expedience without much attention to the social costs 
in terms of identity, policies, procedures and alienation. Recently, scholars started 
to pay attention to the social impacts of organizational change process triggered by 
mergers. Using the social identity approach, Giessner, Horton, and Humborstad 
(2016) explored the impact of mergers and acquisitions activities on employees and 
their local communities. Their study highlighted the importance of identity 
reputation and continuity, intergroup structure, justice and leadership managing 
employee adjustment and identification during the mergers. The authors ultimately 
called for developing a review guideline for assessing social impacts of mergers. 
Without attempting to identify the forces that contribute to post-merger 
employee’s identification, which has been in the center of debates in recent studies 
on mergers and consolidation, Cho, Lee and Kim (2014) explored the relationship 
between employees’ perceptions of relative deprivation –conceptualized as 
dissatisfaction with their jobs– during a merger process and their turnover 
intentions. Cho et al. concluded that “employee identification with the post-merger 
organization was found to fully mediate the relationship between egoistic relative 
deprivation and turnover intention” (p. 421). The positive correlation between job 
dissatisfaction and turnover intention is hardly a surprise. What is intriguing though 
is the role of post-merger identification, which is a result of multiple factors mostly 
associated with pre-merger status, communication and continuity. Such reality 
present post-merger human resources units with daunting dilemmas because some 
of the problems with employees’ dissatisfaction appears to be a byproduct of the 
merger process.  
To this end, perhaps the broader question that organizational theorists might 
want to examine is whether organizational identification is all that good and 
welcomed given the need for constant organizational change in response to 
recurring technological and societal changes. This question raises doubt about 
organizational identification in the private sector which have been sold as all 
positive and good in increasing employees’ productivity, commitment, morale and 
loyalty. Even public organizations jumped into organizational identification and 
social branding. The push for identification is extended to customers and consumers 
as well. Speaking to this point, Conroy, Henle, Shore, Stelman, (2017) argued that   
research on organizational identification has generally suggested that 
organizational identification is good for individuals and organizations. The authors 
contended that there could be a negative side to the underlying social identity 
processes that govern organizational identification, concluding with the notion that: 
8




Organizational identification can lead to unethical behaviors, 
resistance to organizational change, lower performance, 
interpersonal conflict, negative emotions, and reduced well-being. 
Conditions facilitating these undesirable outcomes include situation 
factors (e.g., identity threats, work characteristics) and person 
factors (e.g., morality, other identifications) (Conroy et al. 2017, p. 
184) 
While the findings of Conroy et al aimed at bringing a balanced view about 
organizational identification, they nevertheless indicate that there is an available 
intellectual space for a whole new theoretical conceptualization of organizational 
identification in the age of inevitable, fast-pace changes. In this study, we primarily 
set out to explore the forces that drive employees’ perception of identification in 
the post-merger ACS. After a deep dive in the literature on employee identification, 
we arrived at a point whether organizational identification is all that good, 
warranting a push for uniformity. These points are likely to be the subject of future 
theoretical debates. In the meantime, there are still other external forces that might 
continue to shape employees’ organizational identification beyond networks, status 
of individuals and merging partners, assumptions and values, and artifacts. There 
is no need to emphasize how far external factors can influence internal dynamics, 
however looking at external factors as stand-alone forces remain imperative for 
understanding the context, condition, and climate of mergers.           
 
Political Forces and Mergers: Cost and Quality as a conduit for Politics 
The general agreement among scholars is that municipal consolidation does not 
reduce costs. Maher (2015) concluded that “for communities that consolidated 
services, overall expenditures increased in some circumstances and expenditure 
reductions were only associated with one service: capacity management” (p 393). 
Moreover, Jimenez and Hendrick (2010) confirmed that municipal consolidation 
does not reduce cost. Focusing on officers’ perception of organizational justice, 
Grant (2011) studied the consolidation of Louisville and Jefferson County police 
departments. While the juxtaposition of law enforcement and social services is 
highly intriguing because historically they have been on opposing perspectives, 
Grant’s research focused on the drivers of differences in officers’ perceptions of 
justice and their professional reaction. One could safely now assume that these 
perceptions were likely to have everything to do with pre-merger status, projected 
continuity, motivational threat, uncertainties and communication climate. The 
reality is that all these elements are mediated and influenced by politics in any given 
public municipal consolidation.  
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Another study about Louisville and Jefferson consolidation by Reed (2013) 
focused on Organizational Change Components (OCC): culture, policies and 
procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining 
patrol division boundaries. Reed concluded that “officers' perception of the 
complexity of merging OCCs was a significant predictor of current support for 
consolidation…officers' prior support for consolidation and officers' satisfaction 
with the results of the merged OCCs were also significant predictors of current 
support for merger” (p.1). Just like officers’ perception of justice, it was reasonable 
to assume that OCCs were also likely to be influenced by politics and political 
motives. This study examined OCC, linking their role in creating conducive 
conditions for service quality.   
         It is often argued that consolidation is about quality of service. Political 
motives sometimes work miracles behind the scene while an economic rationale 
would be used to justify presented notions. In consolidating municipal 
governments, there is always going to be a tension between financial and political 
consideration (Sorensen, 2006). The same can be said about inter-agency merger 
within the same municipality. Commenting on the tension between political 
consideration and finances in consolidation, Gamrat and Haulk (2005) reviewed 
mergers in local governments and concluded that:  
Proponents claim that by merging the two entities, duplicative 
services can be consolidated resulting in a leaner more cost effective 
government. They point to the success of two previous city-county 
mergers: Metro Louisville and Indianapolis UniGov. However the 
evidence from these mergers does not create optimism that cost 
savings or faster economic growth will occur. (p. 3) 
 
Vojnovic (1998) found that streamlining work processes and standards 
become a challenge for consolidating organizations. Specialization and disruption 
of skills is another issue to deal with during and after the merger. At a municipal 
level, Sancton (2001) argued that voluntary consolidation produces better results 
than being centrally imposed. Using functional expedience and quality of service 
argument, Mayor Bloomberg’s rationale for integrating juvenile justice and child 
welfare programs was to facilitate long-term care for the young people and their 
families once they enter the juvenile justice system. It is meant to serve as a focused 
strategy to put the youth on the path toward school, work, and successful adulthood. 
The overarching goal is to decrease the rate of recidivism for youths, a rate that is 
traditionally higher among juvenile offenders than adult criminals (ACS, 2012).  
10




 A report by Bakirtzi, Shoukens and Pieters (2001) reviewed the merger of 
social security administration and tax revenues in multiple European countries and 
concluded that mergers can produce excellent results if organizations can overcome 
the immediate challenges such work processes, culture, mandates, and 
expectations. Another report by Owen, Kelly, Reed, Pittman, and Wagner (2011) 
analyzed 41 mergers of nonprofit organizations, contending that in the pre-merger 
stage, the factors that can be crucial include financial soundness of the merging 
organizations, external conditions, organizational structure, and leadership. Factors 
during the merging process include key stakeholder involvement, role of staff in 
the merger process, integrating formal and informal structures, and providing due 
diligence to the process. We have already indicated that in inter-agency 
consolidation, politics will shape and influence all of the factors associated with the 
merger stages. Research on organizational change has long indicated that 
commitment is imperative and lack of employees’ involvement can be detrimental 
to the process in areas of cultural integration and identification. In the post-merger 
stage, there are four factors: funding and support, service and culture, 
organizational capacity, and structure. Once again, political forces seen as external 
factors will influence funding and support, service and culture, and structure.   
As we have seen so far, inter-agency consolidation is an extreme form of 
organizational change process because it involves change in organization's 
strategies, processes, procedures, technologies, and culture. Although change is 
known to be inevitable or unavoidable in today’s world, more often than not 
organizations struggle to deal with the challenges associated with it. The failure is 
more likely in situations where change is imposed from the top without careful 
planning and employees’ participation. For instance, Bolman and Deal (2013) 
contended that organizations tend to waste resources on strategies to implement 
change, which often fails to provide little to no improvement and sometimes it 
makes the current situation worse. Beer and Nohria (2000) argued that employee 
accept changes more easily when management adopt a participative strategy which 
targets organizational culture rather than top-down approach. Thinking of change 
as a process can help in careful planning and thoughtful implementation with the 
inclusion of employees and other stakeholders (Ormerod, 2007). 
 In today’s rapidly changing technology, an organization’s ability to adapt 
to change is a necessity. Despite this being almost common knowledge, most 
attempts to implement change in public organizations still fail. Generally, it is true 
that people resist change, but more importantly employees tend to resist change and 
automatically assume it will not succeed if they were not involved in the process. 
Thus, approaching the process of change strategically is paramount. Denhardt and 
Denhardt & Aristigeueta (2015) maintained that employees accept change easily 
when they are made aware of the need, which makes it appear less fearful. These 
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elements are consistent with the projected continuity, uncertainties and 
motivational threat as drivers of organizational identification in the post-merger 
stage. There appears to be the paradox of change as politician use improvement in 
service quality as a rationale for inter-agency merger while failure to efficiently 
manage change results in poor organizational performance, decline in employees’ 
moral, and waste of resources (Fachruddin & Mangundjaya 2012). Literature on 
the topic of organizational change is consistent with the notion that the success of 
change depends on employees’ commitment to the change. Therefore, gaining 
employees’ commitment and trust can provide a sense of security and support the 
organizational change. In the following section, we examine the methods used to 




This section explains the methods employed to conduct this study. It covers design 
and rationale, data gathering techniques, sample, and data processing. We begin 
with brief description of the study’s overall methodological design and 
conceptualization then we follow with descriptions of sample, population  and data 
processing.  
 
Study design  
We used a mixed model combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. In this 
way, we were able to connect the analysis from the initial phase to the second phase 
of the study so that both results can be compared (Sandelowski, Voils, & Knafl, 
2009). The decision to use both methodological tools is justified by the nature of 
the research questions that the study set out to answer. While the study is primarily 
concerned with discerning employees’ perceptions of the merger and how 
perceptions affect service quality, research has shown that relying on quantitative 
measures alone in explaining perceptions can be tricky and misleading at times 
even if the sample is large and representative. This has been a common setback in 
the public opinion polling data in recent times, often rendering them unreliable 
because “the science of public surveying is in something of a crisis right now" 
(Geoffrey Skelley, a political analyst at the University of Virginia's Center for 
Politics as cited in Williams, 2015).  People’s response depends largely on how 
questions were framed and the context within which questions were asked. 
Consequently, to eliminate a potential bias, we attempted to triangulate by 
conducting follow-up interviews with participants who responded to the self-
12




administered questionnaire. We also conducted interviews with managers who have 
been with either DJJ or ACS during the merger process. While managers’ views 
are not representative, we contend that they are useful in providing deeper insight 
because they had access to information and networks when the process was 
initiated. 
We used qualitative tools to analyze responses from interviews with 
managers as well as the data collected in the follow-up group interviews. 
Qualitative analysis helped deciphering some of the contradictory quantitative 
responses as well as corroborating validity, assigning meaning, and clarifying 
implications. Fundamentally, we want to deeply understand the forces behind the 
employees’ continuous identification with their old agencies and why OCCs 
(culture, policies, and communication) continue to reflect two agencies while there 
is only one agency with one mission and a new mandate.  
 
Population, Sample and Data Gathering 
Currently, there are about 8,000 employees who work for ACS, of which around 
800 are in the Division of Youth and Family Justice (DYFJ). So, the population for 
this study is close to 8000 employees after the merger. After providing all relevant 
documents for human subject protection and obtaining the institutional review 
board (IRB) approval, we distributed a self-administered questionnaire to a sample 
of 125 (N) participants who signed the consent form and agreed to take part in the 
study. It is worth mentioning that we have tested the questionnaire for reliability 
and validity with a pilot groups of seven participants before distributing them. Of 
the 125, only 105 (84 percent of distributed questionnaire and .01 percent of the 
total number of employees) participants responded to the questionnaire. We are 
aware that 0.01 percent of employees is very unlikely to be a representative sample 
of the merged organizations. In nutshell, this is a convenient sample, for this was 
an unfunded research conducted during limited periods of access to the field of the 
study. We hope that using three points of contacts– self-administered questionnaire, 
follow up interviews with former participants and managers- can help tell the story 
while acknowledging that we were working with a potentially not a representative 
sample   
Our point of contact with participants was the HR unit at ACS, where 
employees usually come to resolve their routine personnel-related matters of non-
disciplinary nature. In the first phase, we asked those who came to HR during 
October 2015 through February 2016 to complete the survey. We immediately 
followed the self-administered questionnaire with interviews with managers. We 
interviewed 17 staff members in managerial positions who have been with either 
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DJJ or ACS for over 11 years. In the second phase, to address possible perception 
inaccuracies, we obtained access to the field for another short period of time during 
which we reached out to 45 former participants who responded to the self-
administered questionnaire for in-depth follow-up interviews but we only received 
30 responses.  
All respondents were ACS employees at the time who came from various 
units and locations in the city. In essence, while this sampling is not random, we 
assumed that those who came to HR unit during the period of study might share 
similar opinions as other employees. While we have no way of confirming whether 
those who were asked to fill out our survey are comparable to those who were not 
reached because of inapplicability, we have no reason to believe that the responses 
to the questionnaire are not reflective of an ongoing perception about the merger of 
the two agencies. Given the nature and purpose of the study and time constraint, we 
believe this methodological design appears to be sound and sufficient for a 
preliminary exploratory study and can potentially inform future studies in this 
regard. 
 
Data Processing and Interpretation  
We processed the data in two steps. First, we entered the responses from the 
anonymous questionnaires into Excel spreadsheets (available as Appendix A) 
where we categorized responses by demographic, agency affiliation, years of 
service, and response to ten questions closed-ended Likert-type questions with 
responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This allowed us to 
conduct descriptive statistics computation. Second, the contents of the interviews 
were transcribed verbatim before any analysis was attempted. Simple descriptive 
statistics techniques are employed to tabulate data collected through the 
questionnaire.  
  For qualitative responses, i.e. follow-up interviews, all participants 
responses were registered in a word document computer file first. These response 
were then manually classified in codes, categories and themes that were prepared 
based on the research questions and the interview protocol. We used explanatory 
qualitative technique that build on preexisting codes derived from research 
questions. According to Dey  (1993) qualitative data analysis involves nine 
successive steps: data, finding a focus, managing data, reading and annotating, 
categorizing data, linking data, connecting categories, corroborating evidence, and 
producing an account. Tesch (2013) suggested that these steps can broadly be 
divided into two essential stages: de-contextualization and contextualization. As 
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Primarily, contextualization depends upon a systematic process of data 
interpretation during which overall themes and new organizing principles can be 
identified. Producing themes is similar to producing an account. During de-
contextualizing, we used priori coding techniques to identify themes pertaining to 
OCC (culture, policies, procedures, and communication). For new themes we used 
emerging coding techniques. To carefully contextualize these responses we used a 
team (co-authors) to cross-check the themes derived in order to establish inter-rater 
reliability. We also relied on OCC during the merger stages: pre-merger, during the 
merging and post-merging, as discussed in the previous section.   
 
Findings and Discussion 
Of the 105 respondents, 12 has been with ACS for less than five year, 36 between 
5 and10 years, 26 between 11 and 15 years, 22 between 16 and 20 year, and 9 for 
over 21 years. Moreover, 47 of the respondents were initially hired to work for 
ACS, 46 for DJJ and only 12 joined ACS after the merger was completed. The 
distribution of respondents among the three categories, though random, provided 
an opportunity for ideal representation of employees’ perception about the three 
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stages of the merger. 93 of the surveyed employees (88.57 percent) have been 
around when the merger was initiated and implemented. Given that DJJ was taken 
over by ACS, one would expect that those who were DJJ employees at the time are 
likely to respond negatively to the merger. This did not appear to be the case. While 
those who were DJJ employees at the time of the merger were more vocal about 
their views regarding the process, affiliation with DJJ or ACS did not appear to be 
a factor in their current views about the post-merger stage. Speaking to this point 
in a follow-up interview, one of the DJJ respondents stated that: 
I believe the merger was the wrong thing for DJJ. It presents a 
conflict of interest. When we were taken over by ACS (not merged) 
we lost the sense of family that we had in DJJ (we became the little 
fish in the big pond). DJJ was used to getting things done with 
minimal staff. ACS utilizes many staff and things don’t get done and 
are not followed up. 
Another disgruntled, though reasonable, voice added: 
The merger was not well thought out in the best interest of the 
population served. DJJ was law enforcement agency, however, ACS 
is a social service agency. Their missions are different and merging 
the two creates conflict of interest. I would need to write my own 
paper to explain all the reasons and provide credible evidence to 
support what I say. 
Most of the interviewees who held managerial position when the merger 
was announced share similar views. There are those who fundamentally thought 
the merger was not logical in principle. A manager at ACS when the merger was 
announced echoed these points by stating, “DJJ detains children following their 
alleged/convicted criminal act. ACS protects the children from trauma, abuse and 
neglect. The general missions of the two agencies are very different”. Table 2 
summarizes qualitative analysis findings, however as we discuss findings in the 
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Pre-merger Stage   
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With regard to the pre-merger phase, we asked three questions pertaining to 1) The 
logical soundness of the merger, 2) outlining of the process, and 3) Training based 
on the new mission of the ACS. Table 1 shows the distribution of responses 
regarding the pre-merger phase.  
 
Table 3  
Participants’ Responses Pre-merger stage 
Indicator/ Response  Strongly 
agree 
Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
The logical soundness of  
merger 
10 30 36 20 9 
Outlining the process of 
merger  
5 36 30 24 10 
Training based on the new 
mission 
4 27 27 36 11 
Table 1 
 
As appears in Table 1, between not sure, disagree and strongly disagree 
about 65 (about 62 percent) of the respondents did not appear to think that the 
merger was logically sound based on the missions of the two agencies. One 
respondent made these sentiments very clear by stating that “Our mission is to assist 
children and families, unfortunately staff was never consulted or trained when DJJ 
was merged into ACS.” Another added “Both agencies should have never merged. 
It should have stayed the way it was or merge DJJ with a different agency like the 
Department of Probation.” Some respondents did not oppose to the idea of merger 
in principle, but they suggested that merging DJJ with an agency with a closely 
similar mission was a suitable idea. Speaking to this point, one respondents stated 
that “Bloomberg should have merged the agency (DJJ) with another agency like 
Department of Correction for example.” Another added “DJJ needs to merge with 
Correction rather than ACS. There might be conflict of interest with ACS.” Yet, 
another exclaimed “How can you merge ACS that was set to protect children with 
DJJ which works to lock up children! Who does that?” As for the planning and 
training on the imminent merger before its implementation, 64 (about 60.9 percent) 
and 74 (about 70 percent), including not sure responses, of the respondents reported 
that neither planning nor training was provided. We assumed that if an employee 
18




was informed about the merger or trained on the new mission, he or she won’t 
respond by choosing ‘not sure’. One employee stated that: 
The idea of the merger was not announced to employees. The goals 
were not presented to me. To this date, I don’t know if the goals 
were met. Internally, employees were not trained about the 
practices, policies, etc. As a result DJJ continues to follow old 
policies and procedures which place the employees at jeopardy of 
disciplinary charges.  
 
Once again, many of those we interviewed were of the same opinion. We 
are only highlighting some of these views. A participant, who held a manager 
position at the time of the merger added “there was no explanation or training of 
how/why the merger was necessary or the goal or purpose of the merger”. Another 
manager added “I don’t believe that the logic and process… was clearly outlined 
before the merger”. 
 
Merging Process  
To examine employees experience with and perception of the merging process, we 
asked respondents whether they thought the implementation was poorly conceived 
and carried out. To this, 40 responded either agree or strongly agree, 33 not sure 
and 32 disagree or strongly disagree. The fact that there is 65 (61.90 percent) 
thought either the idea of the merger was either bad or not sure suggests the poor 
planning and communication of the rationale to the employees. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that some of the respondents were likely to continue to 
think that the merger was a bad idea not because of planning or lack of knowledge 
but as we have seen because they believe it was not a sound idea in principle. Table 
2 summarizes responses for questions pertaining to the merging process stage. 
 
Table 4  
Participants’ Responses merging stage 







The idea was good but 
the implementation was 
terrible 
4 36 33 25 7 105 
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True merger requires 
mission-driven training 
to all  
17 60 17 11   105 
Table 2 
 
To this end, one respondent argued that “I think it was not a plan well 
thought out as far as employees were concerned.” Another stated that “Planning 
before the merger was insufficient.” A third employee made the case in a point by 
suggesting that:  
Merging the DJJ under the umbrella of ACS was a great idea, 
however, constant training on both child welfare and DJJ is 
necessary. The ACS serves youth in both systems (child 
welfare/DJJ) meaning crossover, worker understanding of both 
systems helps the youth/family. 
 
The lack of robust training in both juvenile delinquency and child welfare 
not only undermine the logic of the merger, but also raises question about any 
potential improvement in service quality that was intended. When we asked 
participants whether they thought that a true merger requires mission-driven 
training, 77 (73.33 percent) responded agree or strongly agree while 17 responded 
not sure and 11 disagree. One interviewee stated that “effective training for 
employees is needed.” There are those who think that mission-driven training might 
not be sufficient to address the deficiencies. A manager elaborated on this by 
suggesting that:  
The agencies merely coexist, but in no way share missions. Nor do 
the agencies share resources. DJJ titles are specifically for DJJ— 
juvenile counselor. ACS are specifically for ACS— CPS, CPM. To 
successfully merge the two, there needs to be one mission, one code 
of conduct, and exchange of resources (staffing and funding).  
 
Here it appears that the quality of service is undermined by continuous 
divergence of the two agencies despite the fact that they are under one management. 
Not only mission alignment does not seem to have taken roots, but even job title 
reflects the pre-merger affiliations.  Differences in culture remain an issue and 
communication between DJJ and ACS doesn’t seem to have improved by the 
consolidation.  
20





Post-merger Stage  
We asked participants whether they perceive the merger as a success, 4 responded 
strongly agree, 33 agree, 38 not sure, 21 disagree, and 9 strongly disagree. It must 
be noted here that the response to this question registered the highest ‘not sure’ in 
the questionnaire. Responses from follow-up interviews helped clarify the 
contradiction in the response to this question and other questions pertaining to the 
reasons for success and existing schism between DJJ and ACS. Table 3 shows the 
responses to questions relating to the post-merger stage. 
 
Table 5  
Participants’ Responses Post-merger stage 







The merger has been a 
success  
4 33 38 21 9 105 
The reason for success 
were planning and 
implementation 
4 24 35 34 8 105 
The division between the 
two agencies is visible 
8 55 27 15   105 
The merger was about 
budget not social service  
6 43 33 21 2 105 
Table 3 
 
One of those who perceive the merger as a success stated that “I believe the 
merger makes the ACS stronger as it concentrates more on rehabilitation than 
incarceration of the juveniles.” Another contradicted that image by reporting that 
“I have not experienced an impact in our work nor are we informed of what takes 
place concerning DJJ and our division.” A third respondent added that “the 
divisions are run separately, the agency overall is divided by the services each 
division provides.” One possible explanation is that unlike DJJ workers, many of 
ACS workers did not have to change the way they carry out their daily duties. 
Another explanation is that almost all the 12 respondents, who joined the agency 
after the merger, did not seem to have an opinion about the merger impacts or 
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whether it was a success or not, but they see and feel the differences.  A manager 
commented that “the merger did not assist ACS in meeting its overarching 
mission”, adding that “there is a clear distinction between ACS and DYFJ 
(goals/mission), and the cultural difference remains.” Once again, OCCs culture, 
policies and procedures, and communication remain unresolved in the post-merger 
phase, which is likely to have impacted mission misalignment, processes, and 
overall service quality.       
When asked whether they thought that the reasons for the merger’s success 
were careful planning and implementation, the responses were similar to whether 
they thought the merger was a success in the first place. That appears to be logical 
and consistent. Participants’ response may help explain the ambivalence about the 
merger, as one respondent stated that “The merger is supposed to provide better 
service for younger children that at times must deal with troubles and juvenile court, 
there is no evidence it did that”.  Another participant added that “Through training 
and well-designed planning and participation, ACS could provide combined 
approach to juvenile justice and youth issues in NYC.” A training to align mission 
and goals that is yet to occur.  
The discrepancy became even more apparent when we asked participants 
whether they believe that a visible division between DJJ and ACS still exists after 
six years of the merger. Overwhelmingly, 63 (60%) believe that there is a visible 
division between ACS and DJJ. On the first glance, one would expect the response 
to the question about whether a merger was a success to be consistent with the 
response to whether a visible division exists or not, i.e. 60 percent were likely to 
think the merger was unsuccessful. However, as discussed previously, one usually 
wouldn’t bother to call something a success or a failure if one is indifferent to the 
process. But it is easier to notice division because employees continue to identify 
with old titles and divisions. Once again follow-up interviews helped clear the 
seeming discrepancy. One respondent put it this way: “DJJ is still having 
difficulties adjusting to ACS.” Another respondent concluded that “It wasn’t a good 
merger, all the workers seem so unhappy and without happy workers, they cannot 
get the job done.”   
A manager attributed the visible division between the merging agencies to 
the fact that “there is no cross-divisional meetings that afford either (DJJ or ACS) 
to benefit globally from the vast services or resources” and that “DJJ has its own 
code of conduct while ACS has a different code of conduct, the separation of 
standards of conduct is the clearest example separate and unequal.” This is a clear 
example of how OCCs are treated in the post-merger stage, the code of conduct 
shapes culture and culture influences communication, processes and mission. How 
could there be an improvement in the quality of service when DJJ remains separate 
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within the ACS. A perceptive respondent attributed the sense of division to 
resistance, stating that:    
When it comes to a merger, both parties should follow the same 
policy and procedure and have the same mission, but …ACS works 
this way and DJJ will continue to work that way. Unity is power to 
success but this merger will continue to be difficult until employees 
stop saying, I work for DJJ and start saying we work together for the 
same reason. Training is not the key, acceptance is the key of 
merger. 
 
Here force filed analysis could provide an insights into why some 
employees resist the merger (Swanson & Creed, 2014). Good explanations of the 
merger rationale (to improve quality of service) might have eased the resistance, 
especially the merger did not involve lay off or major negative impacts on 
personnel. Finally, when we asked participants: in your personal opinion, was there 
a conflict between the budgetary goals of the merger and the social service goals of 
protecting children? 49 (46.57 percent) respondents agreed, 33 were not sure and 
23 disagreed. Of those who disagreed, one participant stated that:  
I believe merging the two agencies was a great idea, both agencies 
are/were dealing with a young population that came together on a 
number of issues … ACS and DJJ thought about a way to unite the 
children with their mothers or fathers who were locked up in the 
system. I believe the focus overall was to unite families, budgetary 
concerns are mostly always a matter in bringing together agencies 
or separating them.   
Another similar voiced echoed that:  
I think the new arrangement was great. It gives youths who are 
considered dangerous or committed crime an opportunity for 
improvement. ACS offers many programs for these youths to 
improve their lives, stay at home with their families, teach them to 
follow rules and guidelines, and most importantly an opportunity to 
get an education and improve their lives. 
 
An opposing voice stated, “Mayor Bloomberg merged both agencies for 
financial reasons.” It is evident that the merger has had logical rationale to improve 
the outcomes for juvenile by bringing all welfare and deterrence in one house and 
some employees see the point, the challenge is whether it did that.    
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Inter-agency consolidation whether driven by cost reduction or quality of service 
remains a topic that call for further empirical examinations. Earlier, we speculated 
that employees’ continuing identification with old agencies indicates that the OCC 
(culture, policies and procedures, and communication) were not sufficiently 
addressed during the three stages of merger. While the employees’ perception about 
the merger were not conclusive one way or another– more so in the post-merger 
stage– regarding the merger success, there is however strong case that culture, 
policies, and communication remain divergent between DYFJ and ACS despite 
being one agency for over six year. Such divergence has implications for mission 
alignment and employees’ understanding of their role, which affected the service 
quality from employees’ perspectives. Employees’ views revealed no evidence that 
the merger has positively impacted how well ACS protects children because the 
Division of Youth and Family Justice is in the house, which still is referred to as 
DJJ. What purpose would having DJJ as part of ACS serve if vision, mission, 
culture, policies, code of conduct, values and assumptions remain frozen in the pre-
merger stage? This is to suggest that our speculations about the merger of DJJ into 
ACS were confirmed.   
There is no conclusive evidence as to why employees’ perceive the merger 
of DJJ into ACS this way. Similar to findings from previous studies, it is possible 
that the pre-merging status of merging DJJ and ACS determined the post-merger 
organizational identification. It could also be the poor design in the pre-merger 
stage coupled with implementation mishaps during the merging stage. It is also 
plausible that not fully involving employees in the merger process is responsible 
for the existing divergence between employee’s perception and management 
declared intentions. However, none of these explanations can justify maintaining 
different policies and procedures. Additionally, there appears to be relative post-
merger internal conflict between two perspectives: the minority voice which 
believe that functional expedience could be achieved versus those who believe that 
the tension between law enforcement and welfare coupled with the way the merger 
was carried out is unlikely to improve the service quality. Here come our study 
limitation as it cannot offer broad and accurate generalization about the merger. 
Yet, this study revealed signs of incomplete merger, which may lead to ill-
conceived goals and misalignment of the organization’s mission. While the overlap 
of activities between then DJJ and ACS was used to justify the merger to better 
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serve children and juvenile in NYC, there is no evidence for improvement of 
service quality based on employees’ views or general news coverage of the 
agency’s records. Mission-driven training appears to be one area that ACS 
management can do to create a sense of one organization with unified goals. 
For broader policy implication, reviewed literature along with findings of 
this study suggest that inter-agency merger, like municipal consolidation, neither 
saves cost nor improves quality of service. An alternative approach to functional 
expedience calls for consideration, perhaps simultaneous dual process of service 
merging leading to complete absorption of one agency by another over a period of 
time. Finally, an area of exploration for future research can be on the effect of time 
on change of perceptions within merging organization. Intellectually, given all what 
we know about complex organizations in the 21st century, we have to be cognizant 
of the fact that organizational realities often take a life of their own, including 
identification, which can make them less responsive to rational assumptions. 
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